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I. INTRODUCTION
Securities regulation laws aim primarily to protect investors from fraud
in connection with the sale of securities. Texas’s main statute for combat-
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ting this type of fraud is the Texas Securities Act (TSA).1 The Texas State
Securities Board (TSSB) is the regulatory body charged with the statute’s
enforcement,2 but aggrieved plaintiffs may also bring private causes of
action for TSA violations.3 At the federal level, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) creates rules and regulations regarding the se-
curities markets and has the power to bring civil enforcement actions.4
Certain provisions of the federal securities laws, including the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act)
also give rise to private actions, which are commonly brought as class
action lawsuits.5
The year, 2020 was a relatively sluggish year for private securities litiga-
tion and class actions. Indeed, securities class actions decreased signifi-
cantly from the prior year in the first half of 2020—attributable to the
COVID-19 pandemic court closures and a decreased number of mergers
at the onset of the pandemic.6 Despite the pandemic, the SEC brought
715 enforcement actions, down surprisingly only 17% from the prior
year.7 The SEC also saw record-breaking monetary recoveries including
$3.589 billion in disgorgement,8 $1.091 billion in civil penalties,9 and, sep-
arately, $175 million paid to whistleblowers who reported violations to
the agency.10 The steady flow of enforcement actions is likely also a result
of the myriad opportunities for fraud and misleading disclosures occa-
sioned by the pandemic and the many market disruptions and opportuni-
ties it created.
This Article updates the Texas-based securities practitioner on notable
developments in securities regulation, primarily within the period of De-
cember 1, 2019, to November 30, 2020. Part II analyzes Texas and federal
enforcement actions and trends. This will be followed by a review and
evaluation of the Texas Securities Act and federal securities law cases,
including common pleading pitfalls demonstrated by investors in bringing
securities fraud claims, in Part III. Part IV will examine a critical Su-
preme Court case involving disgorgement as an equitable remedy and
1. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-1–581-45.
2. See Texas State Securites Board, TEX. STATE SEC. BD., https://www.ssb.texas.gov/
#:~:text=the%20mission%20of%20the%20State,of%20new%20jobs%20in%20Texas
[https://perma.cc/VF5P-BCZ2].
3. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 581-33.
4. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2), 78(j).
5. See Brian Elzweig, Unintended Consequences, Loopholes, and Gibberish: Why
There Are Still Securities Act Class Actions in State Courts, 7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 153,
156–58 (2019).
6. James R. Carroll, Jay B. Kasner, Scott D. Musoff, Alisha Q. Nanda & Noelle M.
Reed, Developments and Trends in Securities Litigation: Mid-Year Update 2020, SKADDEN,
ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights/
publications/2020/10/key-takeaways-developments-and-trends [https://perma.cc/8QRC-
5HPM].
7. DIV. OF ENF’T, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N ANN. REP. 16 (2020), https://
www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR4Q-USKT].
8. Id. at 17.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 5.
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subsequent legislation effective January 1, 2021. In addition, Part IV ad-
dresses developments on the continuing constitutionality of bringing se-
curities claims before administrative law judges. Part V reviews new and
proposed rulemakings, SEC priorities and policy shifts under the Biden
administration, and makes predictions for the year ahead.
II. ENFORCEMENT UPDATES
A. TEXAS ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
In Texas, the TSSB administers and enforces the provisions of the
TSA.11 The TSSB often enforces the TSA by issuing emergency cease
and desist orders. These enforcement actions commonly center on fraud
in foreign exchange markets and cryptocurrency-related investment
schemes,12 as well as in oil and gas investments, all of which proved to be
a continuing focus over the past year.13
The TSSB focuses on oil and gas investments because of the complexity
of the subject matter to lay investors and the highly speculative nature of
the investment.14 As in prior years, the TSSB obtained successful cease
and desist orders against oil and gas drilling programs soliciting potential
investors. For example, the TSSB obtained a cease and desist order
against a promoter who solicited drilling program investments online and
on LinkedIn. The promoter touted the investment’s profitability despite
the decline in the price of oil to $20.00 per barrel and had failed to pay
obligations to prior investors.15
The TSSB shut down another promoter who advertised its investment
as “mailbox money,” promising: (1) a well would initially produce 2,000
barrels of oil per day and recover up to two million barrels total; (2) re-
turns between 54% and 221% of the principal investment; and (3) the
investment would still return between 22% and 74% profits even with the
decrease in oil prices.16
In another successful cease and desist action, an independent oil and
gas company made misleading statements in advertising its investments in
the working interest of a well in Michigan as “annuity-like” invest-
ments.17 The TSSB found such a comparison was fraudulent and mislead-
11. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-2; About Us, TEX. STATE SEC. BD., https://
www.ssb.texas.gov/about-us [https://perma.cc/3KLG-W8YY].
12. See The Investor’s Guide to Cryptocurrency Offerings, TEX. STATE SEC. BD., https:/
/www.ssb.texas.gov/investors-guide-cryptocurrency-offerings [https://perma.cc/L5EW-
X4VL].
13. See infra notes 14–20.
14. See Top 10 Investor Threats (In Time for the Holidays), TEX. STATE SEC. BD.
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/top-10-investor-threats-time-
holidays [https://perma.cc/9SRE-BRV5].
15. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Tex. Shallow Oil & Gas, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-1802,
2020 WL 2029877, at *1 (Apr. 16, 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
16. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re PRT Consulting, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-1810, 2020
WL 3412283, at *5 (June 17, 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
17. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Energy Investment Partners, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-
1818, 2020 WL 5353333, at *2–3 (Sept. 1, 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
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ing.18 Unlike annuities, which provide regular disbursements for long-
term investments and are designed to protected purchasers (often retirees
from outliving income), unregistered working interests in oil and gas
wells are volatile and often risky investments.19 Additionally, the descrip-
tion of “annuity-like” was also misleading because Texas insurance laws
applicable to annuities that protect consumers do not apply to working
interests in oil wells.20
The TSSB also issued a number of successful cease and desist orders
against individuals alleged to have violated the TSA through cryptocur-
rency scams. For example, an entity and individuals in Spain who sought
new investors targeted Texas residents for their “crypto-fiat arbitrage
trading program,” flaunting returns of 16% per month by using artificial
intelligence, “advanced algorithms,” and “bots” to find optimum mo-
ments for trading in foreign currency exchange and cryptocurrency mar-
kets.21 They also encouraged their investors to use bitcoin to purchase
their own “internal use utility token,” the “MCcoin.”22 Another
cryptocurrency scheme involved soliciting investment plans through the
internet and promising the investment’s profitability (and up to 600% re-
turns), regardless of the changes in the value of bitcoin, a notoriously
volatile cryptocurrency.23 Still another crypto-scam involved an entity
and an account manager selling investment plans to investors based upon
their claimed ability to both trade and “mine” cryptocurrency.24 They
also assured profitability despite bitcoin price changes, and falsely repre-
sented their registration with the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion (CFTC).25
Not surprisingly, cryptocurrency and foreign exchange fraud over-
lapped with pandemic-related fraud in 2020. In 2020, the TSSB pursued
scammers attempting to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic, capitalizing off
market volatility and failing to make disclosures about the associated
risks to potential investors. For example, the TSSB issued a cease and
desist order in one enforcement action against an unregistered dealer
who solicited investments in foreign exchange and binary options trading
by telling investors that the “stock market is crumbling,” and “inviting
them to ‘profit off the coronavirus’” pandemic, all while misappropriating
invested funds.26 The TSSB also brought a successful cease and desist




21. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Mind Capital, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-1814, 2020 WL
4281050, at *2 (July 16, 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
22. Id.
23. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re LoudMines, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-1812, 2020 WL
3960489, at *1–2 (July 8, 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
24. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Swiftminex, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-1813, 2020 WL
3960490, at *1–3 (July 8, 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
25. Id.
26. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Kenzley Ramos, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-1803, 2020 WL
2029878, at *1 (Apr. 17, 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
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rency through a Facebook group and Craigslist, and making materially
misleading statements to investors that COVID-19 “helped [him] tremen-
dously” in returning “huge profits” from bitcoin trades without disclosing
the risk inherent in cryptocurrency markets.27 Similarly, in another ac-
tion, the TSSB ordered an unregistered dealer and its agent to cease and
desist from selling securities when they were advising potential investors
to “tak[e] advantage of changes in the markets due to COVID-19” by
using their 401k funds to purchase forex accounts managed by respon-
dents.28 In another action, the TSSB ordered a promoter to cease and
desist from selling securities in a “Master Account Client Trading Pro-
gram” that he characterized as a “recession-proof” investment that could
provide “supplemental income” to families and retirees enduring eco-
nomic hardships during the recessionary markets of COVID-19.29
B. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT UPDATES REVIEW
1. SEC Enforcement Trends
The SEC has also brought various enforcement actions pertaining to
COVID-19-related fraud. Similarly, the SEC issued a number of trading
suspensions against companies making claims about COVID diagnostics,
treatments, and business models, and against companies who were un-
timely in filing required periodic or annual reporting with the SEC.30
Among the first of the enforcement actions was a charge against a Flor-
ida company and its CEO for allegedly making false and misleading state-
ments about its ability to source and guarantee supply of hefty quantities
of N95 and other masks.31 In May, the SEC successfully shut down two
more companies’ fraudulent activities: one for purporting to sell “finger-
prick COVID-19 tests” that were not approved by the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration, and another for representing that its thermal scan-
ning equipment to detect fevers was “99.99%” accurate and “designed to
be deployed IMMEDIATELY in each State”—despite lacking any con-
tracts to sell or partnerships in place to do so.32 In yet another case, the
SEC charged and suspended trading of a California company for alleg-
edly engaging in a “pump and dump” scheme which involved making
hundreds of allegedly false and misleading statements online, including
27. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re Nickolas Steele, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-1804, 2020 WL
2615704, at *1, *5 (May 15, 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
28. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re KP Financials, LLC, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-1827, 2020
WL 7024148, at *3 (Nov. 19, 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
29. Tex. State Sec. Bd., In re James Frederick Walsh, Order No. ENF-20-CDO-1800,
2020 WL 1844129, at *2 (Apr. 3. 2020) (emergency cease and desist order).
30. SEC Coronavirus (COVID-19) Response, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://
www.sec.gov/sec-coronavirus-covid-19-response [https://perma.cc/Z4YQ-RFBX].
31. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2020-97, SEC Charges Company and
CEO for COVID-19 Scam (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-97
[https://perma.cc/5YHQ-N5GQ].
32. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2020-111, SEC Charges Companies and
CEO for Misleading COVID-19 Claims (May 14, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2020-111 [https://perma.cc/C2D8-VQPC].
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statements related to its development of an “approved” COVID-19 blood
test.33 The SEC also charged six off-shore entities and five individuals for
allegedly engaging in a fraudulent scheme by selling illegal company
stock while concealing the identities of persons who controlled the com-
pany.34 Additionally, the SEC charged these persons for making mislead-
ing representations to dupe investors by representing their ability to
produce medical-quality face masks.35 In another action, the SEC
charged a corporation’s president for allegedly representing his com-
pany’s development of a COVID-19 blood test and advertising “high de-
mand” for the test, despite not yet having purchased the materials to
create the test.36 Besides enforcement actions, numerous companies re-
ceived temporary trading suspensions due to offering COVID-19 related
medical supplies and claimed treatments,37 a trend expected to continue.
COVID-19-related fraud enforcement also extended to companies who
failed to make accurate disclosures about their financial position because
of the pandemic. The SEC issued guidance in April that companies
should provide “as much information as is practicable regarding their cur-
rent financial and operating status,” and their financial planning for the
future with regard to their disclosures.38 And the SEC was not hesitant to
enforce that guidance, capping off the year by settling with restaurant
The Cheesecake Factory for making false representations in its March
and April 2020 SEC filings.39 The SEC stated The Cheesecake Factory
falsely represented it was “operating sustainably,” despite losing $6 mil-
lion a week and having only enough cash left to operate for sixteen
33. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2020-128, SEC Charges California
Trader Engaged in Manipulative Trading Scheme Involving COVID-19 Claims (June 9,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-128 [https://perma.cc/DG58-8EJ5].
34. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2020-131, SEC Charges Microcap
Fraud Scheme Participants Attempting to Capitalize on the COVID-19 Pandemic (June 11,
2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-131 [https://perma.cc/W6A3-XWCB].
35. Id.
36. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2020-224, SEC Charges Top Executive
of California Microcap Company for Misleading Claims Concerning COVID-19 Test and
Financial Statements (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-224
[https://perma.cc/W28P-WABU].
37. See, e.g., No Borders, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 88549, 2020 WL 1686461
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2020/34-88549.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VA2B-9DR2] (COVID-19 test kits and distributions of PPE); Predictive Technol-
ogy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 88719, 2020 WL 1940991 (Apr. 21, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2020/34-88719.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX4E-9DVK] (se-
rology tests to detect antibodies); EastWest Bioscience Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
89265, 2020 WL 3883272 (July 8, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2020/34-
89265.pdf [https://perma.cc/SXA9-4ELW] (statements that FDA approved issuer’s hand
sanitizer).
38. Jay Clayton & William Hinman, The Importance of Disclosure–For Investors, Mar-
kets and Our Fight Against COVID-19, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 8, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-hinman [https://perma.cc/2X9V-
HEM7].
39. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 2020-306, SEC Charges The Cheese-
cake Factory for Misleading COVID-19 Disclosures (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press-release/2020-306 [https://perma.cc/6DL6-4SAR].
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weeks.40 Ultimately the restaurant agreed to cease and desist and paid a
$125,000.00 penalty.41 Some companies had trading suspended for failure
to file timely disclosures in general. For example, the SEC temporarily
suspended “Zoom Technologies” out of concerns for adequacy of its pub-
lic filings (or lack thereof—because it had filed no public disclosures since
2015), and out of concerns for confusing the issuer with the similarly-
named NASDAQ issuer, Zoom Video Communications.42
2. DOJ Enforcement Trends
The Department of Justice (DOJ) investigates criminal fraud through
its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), Health Care Fraud (HCF),
and Market Integrity and Major Frauds (MIMF) Units. Securities fraud
prominently overlaps with two of its three major fraud units—HCF and
MIMF. Across all three fraud units, the DOJ charged 326 individuals in
2020.43 More than half of those prosecutions were related to Health Care
Fraud for an alleged $3.77 billion in fraud-related losses.44 As part of the
HCF Unit’s COVID-19 fraud initiative, the DOJ worked closely with fed-
eral law enforcement and public health officials to combat emerging
trends related to healthcare fraud.45 Specifically, the HCF Unit tackled
issues such as “COVID-19 test bundling schemes, securities fraud cases
involving healthcare technology companies, and Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA) fraud cases.”46 The DOJ brought its
very first COVID-19-related action in March 2020 in Austin against oper-
ators engaging in a wire fraud scheme by selling coronavirus vaccine kits
(when no approved vaccines existed at that time).47 HCF Unit expects
prosecutions related to both COVID-19 and securities fraud schemes to
continue in the future.48
Almost half of the other total prosecutions this year comprised MIMF
actions.49 MIMF investigates financial fraud schemes and prosecutes
complex schemes dealing with binary options, cryptocurrency, pyramid-
schemes, and Ponzi-schemes.50 Recently, its efforts have included prose-
cuting fraudulent schemes related to Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
loans and securities schemes attempting to exploit the COVID-19 pan-
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Zoom Technologies, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 88477, 2020 WL 1610845
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/suspensions/2020/34-88477.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5Y2W-GHH3].
43. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD SECTION YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2020), https://
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/1370171/download [https://perma.cc/93FA-KVNR].
44. Id.
45. Id. at 25.
46. Id.
47. Justice Department Files Its First Enforcement Action Against COVID-19 Fraud,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-
files-its-first-enforcement-action-against-covid-19-fraud [https://perma.cc/VPR3-XZDW].
48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 43, at 25.
49. Id. at 5.
50. Id. at 34.
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demic.51 In 2020, MIMF charged ninety-seven defendants across sixty-
seven cases involving PPP-fraud, amounting to an alleged $260 million in
losses.52 In addition, the MIMF Unit has also focused on cases involving
public companies misleading investors in connection with the pandemic.53
3. Parallel DOJ and SEC Enforcement Actions
In some cases, the SEC and DOJ work in tandem to investigate and
prosecute securities fraud. This year had a handful of such parallel actions
of note. In one action, the SEC found Wells Fargo “misled investors
about the success of its core business strategy” while it opened unautho-
rized accounts for its customers.54 Ultimately, Wells Fargo was ordered to
pay the SEC a $500 million civil penalty as part of a $3 billion settlement
with the SEC and DOJ.55 In another settled action in which the DOJ and
the CFTC also brought parallel matters, the SEC found that JP Morgan
“fraudulently engaged in manipulative trading of U.S. Treasury securi-
ties.”56 After admitting to the SEC’s findings, J.P. Morgan paid $10 mil-
lion in disgorgement and a civil penalty of $25 million as part of the
settlement.57
III. TEXAS AND FEDERAL SECURITIES FRAUD CASES
Although courts across the country saw a slowdown in securities litiga-
tion during the first half of the year due to court closures, both Texas
state and federal courts issued a number of decisions regarding the TSA,
federal securities acts, or cases implicating other areas of fraud. Because
the TSA’s language was modeled off the federal acts and they are inter-
preted similarly,58 this Part will explore both Texas cases and federal se-
curities cases from within the Fifth Circuit.
A. TEXAS COURTS CONTINUE TO DECLINE TO RECOGNIZE COMMON
LAW CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD
The Third Austin Court of Appeals this year declined to create a new
cause of action for aiding and abetting fraud.59 Hampton v. Equity Trust
Co. involved an investor who sued Equity Trust Company for “aiding and
abetting” violations of the TSA and common law fraud, alleging that they
had participated with the co-defendant who defrauded investors by sell-
51. Id. at 32.
52. Id. at 33.
53. Securities Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/se-
curities-fraud [https://perma.cc/7AXJ-VE6X].
54. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 7, at 3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. George Lee Flint, Jr., Securities Regulation, 6 SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 363, 376
(2020); see Highland Cap. Mgmt., LP, v. Ryder Scott Co., 402 S.W.3d 719, 741 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
59. Hampton v. Equity Tr. Co., 607 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, pet. filed).
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ing participation shares in promissory notes that turned out to be worth-
less.60 The court below rendered judgment for the plaintiff on her
common law fraud claim, but set aside the jury’s verdict for the TSA
claim.61
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that civil liability for aiding and abet-
ting fraud existed in Texas—and if it did not, urged the court to adopt
Section 876 of the Restatement of Torts.62 The court noted that the Texas
Supreme Court had left open the question of whether the theory of liabil-
ity in § 876 is recognized in Texas.63 In the absence of Texas Supreme
Court or legislative recognition, the court declined to recognize a com-
mon law cause of action for aiding and abetting.64 Accordingly, the court
reversed the judgment on the common law fraud claim.65
B. THE TEXAS ANTI-SLAPP AS APPLIED TO FRAUD UNDER THE
TSA
Defendants charged with TSA claims have attempted to have charges
dismissed, arguing that their allegedly fraudulent statements were pro-
tected by free speech and freedom of association rights. In Anders v.
Oates, the Second Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether the
Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) applied to claims against an
agent of the purchasers for violations of the Texas Securities Act.66 The
sellers alleged that they signed an Interest Purchase Agreement selling
100% of their ownership interest in two companies—for which purchas-
ers had failed to pay both the purchase price and the debts.67 The agent
of the purchasers argued in his TCPA motion to dismiss that the sellers
sought to impose liability based on his “exercise of the right of associa-
tion” with the group that acquired the companies.68 He further argued
that to the extent the court construed the claims against him as alleging
misrepresentations of the purchase price, the TCPA would apply to bar
the claims because they would be based on a communication made in
connection with “economic concerns,” thereby implicating the freedom
of speech.69 The court rejected both arguments, holding that the TCPA’s
protection for freedom of association’s “common interest” “requires
more than two tortfeasors conspiring to act tortiously for their own selfish
benefit.”70 Likewise, the TCPA did not apply to statements about the
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 4 (citing First United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d
214, 224 (Tex. 2017)).
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 8–9.
66. Anders v. Oates, No. 02-19-00116-CV, 2020 WL 1809654, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Apr. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
67. Id. at *1–2.
68. Id. at *2.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *5 (citing Kawcak v. Antero Res. Corp., 582 S.W.3d 566, 588 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied)).
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purchase price because the alleged communications were related only to
the “pecuniary interests of the defendants,” rather than protected state-
ments “related to matters of political, social, or other concern to the
community.”71
C. INVESTOR PLEADING DEFICIENCIES
Investors bringing fraud claims under the federal acts must plead six
elements: (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter; (3)
a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance; (5) eco-
nomic loss; and (6) loss causation.72 Additionally, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) creates a heightened pleading standard
that requires plaintiffs to “specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if
an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information
and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which
that belief is formed.”73 Regarding scienter, a federal claim requires the
plaintiff to allege facts demonstrating a “strong inference” that the defen-
dant had the requisite state of mind.74 TSA violations largely mirror the
federal elements, but do not require pleading the element of scienter.75
These elements of “material omissions” for federal and TSA claims and
“strong inference” of scienter for federal claims are frequently inade-
quately pled by plaintiffs, subjecting their securities claims to 12(b)(6)
dismissal. The following cases will examine case law discussing these and
other common investor pleading deficiencies.
1. Preliminary Issues: Failing to Adequately Brief Whether Investments
Were “Securities,” Failure to Adequately Allege Personal
Jurisdiction
In Crain v. E&M Operating, the court denied default judgment for al-
leged violations of the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act, and the
Texas Securities Act because plaintiffs did not adequately brief whether
the promissory notes at issue were “securities” under the relevant laws.76
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ sale of promissory notes and promise
to provide the notes, together with a signed subscription agreement and
private placement memo regarding the oil and gas investments showed
that the transactions at issue were “investment contracts,” and thus were
71. Id. at *7.
72. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)–4(b).
73. 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)–4(b)(1).
74. Id. § 78(u)–4(b)(2).
75. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 343–44 (5th Cir. 2008) (“an article
581-33 claim does not require scienter[.]”). Instead, plaintiffs need only prove that a secur-
ity was sold by means of (1) an untrue statement of material fact, or (2) an omission of a
material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 581-33(A)(2).
76. Crain v. E&M Operating, L.L.C., No. 18-CV-00548, 2019 WL 6770732, at *5 (W.D.
La. Dec. 11, 2019).
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properly considered “securities.”77 However, the court denied the claims
because plaintiffs failed to provide evidence or authority showing an in-
vestment contract existed under similar circumstances.78
In Kliebert v. Metallicus, plaintiffs failed to allege facts sufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction over the defendants, who plaintiffs alleged
violated the TSA.79 As the basis of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiffs
alleged that they attended a presentation by defendants (outside of
Texas) and subsequently made investments while they were in Texas
based on those marketing efforts.80 The court found that this was insuffi-
cient to establish that defendants had minimum contacts with the state.81
No facts showed defendants targeted their marketing efforts to Texas re-
sidents, and jurisdiction could not rest on “mere fortuity” that plaintiffs
themselves were Texas residents and defendants allegedly committed
business torts against them.82
2. Failing to Adequately Plead Misstatements and Omissions
a. Heinze v. Tesco Corp.—Failure to Plead Misstatements or
Omissions, or Plead Around PSLRA Safe Harbor
In Heinze, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lead plaintiff
shareholder failed to allege a plausible claim under the Exchange Act and
SEC Rule 14a-9 through allegations that defendant’s proxy statement
contained materially misleading statements.83 Specifically, the share-
holder argued that three parts of the proxy statement were misleading:
(1) the statement that Tesco shareholders would receive a “significant”
19% premium over closing price on the last day of trading as a result of a
proposed acquisition; (2) a table containing projections for revenue and
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization
(EBITDA) in 2017 and 2018; and (3) the summary of the fairness opinion
of the defendant’s bank.84 With regard to the first statement, the court
found that a reasonable shareholder would have relied on the quantity of
the premium (19%), and not the adjective “significant” in reviewing the
proxy, and as such, the statement was not materially misleading.85
As to the EBIDTA projections, the court found that the plaintiff’s
vague allegations that the projections did not demonstrate the full extent
of Tesco’s “growth potential” based on projections of oil prices increasing
was insufficient to allege a claim based on material omissions.86 Addition-
77. Id. at *4.
78. Id. at *5.
79. Kliebert v. Metallicus, Inc., No. 4:19-CV-2250, 2020 WL 1672817, at *4 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 3, 2020).
80. Id. at *3.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Heinze v. Tesco Corp., 971 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. 2020).
84. Id. at 480.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 481–82.
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ally, because companies have no obligation to provide already existing
information about commodity price trends, defendants “certainly had no
obligation to include additional projections based on potentially inaccu-
rate assumptions about future price trends.”87 By failing to allege a viable
claim that the projections were misleading, the plaintiff was left with a
pure omissions claim “untethered” to any misleading statement, which
was ultimately not actionable.88 The court also held that, in any event, the
EBITDA projections fell within the PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-
looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.89
The court disposed of the fairness opinion summary for the same reasons
as the EBIDTA projections.90
b. Callinan v. Lexicon Pharmaceuticals—Failure to Plead
Actionable Misrepresentation
In Callinan, the shareholder lead plaintiffs argued that the defendant
drug company violated Sections 10-b and 20 of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 by fraudulently failing to disclose FDA concerns expressed
about a clinical trial for one of the drugs it manufactured.91 The court
held that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not contain facts showing when,
where, to whom, or how the FDA made an actual communication demon-
strating concern about a composite endpoint in a clinical trial that was
available to defendants at the time the statement was made.92 Accord-
ingly, plaintiffs’ allegations that the defendant’s statements about achiev-
ing that endpoint were false and misleading were “not sufficiently
particularized to state claim[s] for securities fraud by omission.”93 Fur-
thermore, even if the misrepresentations were actionable, the plaintiffs
failed to adequately plead scienter. The court found that plaintiffs’ com-
plaint lacked allegations of fact sufficient to establish that defendants ei-
ther withheld information about the clinical trial’s design, the results, or
anything showing that defendants were aware of contrary information at
the time the statement was made.94 Thus, the court granted the defend-
ants’ motion to dismiss.95
c. Heck v. Orion—“Fraud by Hindsight” Insufficient to State an
Exchange Act Claim
In Heck v. Orion, the class-action shareholder plaintiffs alleged that
Orion Group Holdings violated Sections 10-b and 20a of the Exchange
87. Id. at 482 (citing Kapps v. Torch Offshore, Inc., 379 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2004)).
88. Id. at 483.
89. Id. at 483–84 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)-5(c)(1)(A)(i)).
90. Id. at 484–85.
91. Callinan v. Lexicon Pharms., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 3d 379, 403 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14,
2020).
92. Id. at 405–06.
93. Id. at 406.
94. Id. at 431.
95. Id. at 442.
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Act, as well as Rule 10-b because defendants (1) “improperly recognized
revenue beyond what was authorized on the [c]ompany’s contracts,” falsi-
fied two years’ worth of financial results and “reported significantly more
revenue than the [c]ompany actually received,” and (2) made public
statements about the company’s goodwill, doubtful accounts, estimates,
or filed SOX certifications that were false or misleading.96 However, the
plaintiffs failed to plead any facts demonstrating how or why the state-
ments were false when made. The court found that the statements of
booking “significantly more revenue” than received were too vague to
satisfy the pleading requirements for securities fraud when plaintiffs
failed to make a showing as to the amount of revenue falsely booked or
the reasons why it was false.97 Further, the court did not accept plaintiffs’
“fraud by hindsight” allegations that previous positive statements must
have been false when made.98 Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to meet
the heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA.99
d. Brooks v. United Development Funding III, LP—Successful
Pleading of Material Omissions
In a lengthy case examining TSA claims at the motion to dismiss stage,
and after taking the plaintiffs allegations as true as required, the court
found that the shareholder plaintiffs sufficiently plead most of their al-
leged claims on material misstatements and omissions for primary liabil-
ity against entity defendants, and were narrowly sufficient in alleging
control-person liability against entity and individual defendants.100 How-
ever, the plaintiffs’ pleadings were too conclusory to state a claim for aid-
ing and abetting liability of the individual defendants and an auditing
firm.101
Plaintiffs brought a putative class action alleging violations of the TSA
in connection with the purchase and sale of securities offered by United
Development Funding III, LP (UDF III) in its Dividend Reinvestment
Plan (DRIP).102 Plaintiffs sued several individuals and entities: (1) UDF
III and many of its general partners, limited partners, and “advisors” to
subsequent investing vehicles (collectively, the UDF Entity Defendants);
(2) Whitley Penn LLP, an independent auditor for UDF III; and (3) high-
ranking officers of UDF III and its general partners and asset managers
(collectively, the UDF Individual Defendants).103 Plaintiffs alleged that
the UDF Entity and Individual Defendants made false and misleading
public filings that lead them to “forego[e] receipt of cash distributions”
96. Heck v. Orion Grp. Holdings, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 3d 828, 851 (S.D. Tex. June 19,
2020).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 848–49.
99. Id.
100. Brooks v. United Dev. Funding III LP, No. 4:20-CV-00150-O, 2020 WL 6132230,
at *25 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2020).
101. Id. at *28.
102. Id. at *2–3.
103. Id. at *2.
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and instead used distributions to purchase additional stock.104 Plaintiffs
asserted both primary liability as against the UDF Entity Defendants and
secondary “control-person” liability and “aiding and abetting” liability as
against both the UDF Entity Defendants and Individual Defendants.105
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged various misstatements and omissions in
the UDF Entity Defendants’ offering materials that described their busi-
ness. For example, they alleged UDF III was exceeding the Partnership
Agreement’s stated 20% cap on loans to any one borrower as reflected
by UDF III’s public filings, and representing in public filings that certain
loans were fully collectible when such collection was doubtful.106 Further-
more, plaintiffs contended that Whitley Penn aided and abetted these al-
leged violations by being in a position to know about “shifting loan
proceeds among related entities” and certifying UDF III’s financial state-
ments anyway.107
First, the court dismissed entirely plaintiff Brooks’s claims that were
based on purchase of DRIP units between 2010 and 2013 as barred by the
TSA’s five-year statute of repose, and shortened the class-period to se-
curities purchased from November 21, 2013, onward.108 As to the remain-
ing claims that were not time-barred, the UDF Entity Defendants moved
to dismiss the primary liability TSA claim. The court denied most of the
Entity Defendants’ motion to dismiss, only granting the motion to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ primary liability TSA claim to the extent it was based on
the alleged non-disclosure of an SEC investigation and alleged misrepre-
sentations of future intent.109
UDF Entity Defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to plead their
allegations of fraud with particularity as required by Federal Civil Proce-
dure Rule 9(b).110 However, the court found that plaintiffs identified the
documents that they contended were materially misleading, specified the
time periods during which the documents were used to promote each of-
fering, and described in detail the alleged false and misleading represen-
tations and the reasons why they were fraudulent.111 Accordingly, they
met their burden to plead with specificity at the motion to dismiss
stage.112
The UDF Entity Defendants also argued that the public disclosures,
which showed that UDF III made loans in conjunction with affiliates, ne-
gated the plaintiffs’ claims for misstatements in their public filings.113 The
court disagreed, stating that, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, it was
104. Id. at *3.
105. Id. at *10.
106. Id. at *3–7.
107. Id. at *9.
108. Id. at *15. For further discussion of the TSA’s statute of repose, see infra Section
III.D.
109. Id. at *20–21.
110. Id. at *17.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *17–18.
113. Id. at *18–19.
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not clear that a reasonable investor would have been aware from the pub-
lic filings that Entity Defendants were using affiliates to loan money to
UDF III, thus creating “the appearance of a successful series of real es-
tate investment trusts.”114 With regard to the allegation that Entity De-
fendants’ lent more than 20% of the capital contributions to one
borrower, the court found that plaintiffs plausibly stated a claim by alleg-
ing certain years and borrowers for the alleged overspending.115 How-
ever, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they were
based on Entity Defendants’ alleged failure to disclose an SEC investiga-
tion because such an omission was not misleading when defendants did
not have a duty to disclose the investigation.116 Additionally, the court
granted the motion to dismiss with respect to allegations of future intent
also because the plaintiffs failed to allege scienter.117
With respect to “control-person liability” of the UDF Entity and Indi-
vidual Defendants, the court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations of fact
regarding the common group of directors and officers, the individuals’
senior or controlling positions within UDF III and its related entities,
their power to control the form of UDF III’s registrations and reports,
and their access to non-public information were sufficient to withstand a
motion to dismiss.118
As to the plaintiffs’ claims against all three categories of defendants for
aiding and abetting liability, the court held that “by a narrow margin,”
the plaintiffs’ facts created a plausible inference of such liability only as
the UDF Entity Defendants.119 Facts that certain entities were the limited
and/or general partners for each other or the “advisor” of certain UDF
III affiliates, when combined with the other specific allegations set forth
regarding misrepresentations, were sufficient to adequately plead aiding
and abetting liability.120 However, because the plaintiffs wholly failed to
address the Individual Defendants’ arguments supporting dismissal of
their secondary liability claims, the court granted the UDF Individual De-
fendants’ motion to dismiss based on aiding and abetting.121 Similarly, the
plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Whitley Penn were too conclusory to
withstand a motion to dismiss based on aiding and abetting liability be-
cause they rested almost entirely on Whitley Penn’s status as an
auditor.122
114. Id. at *19.
115. Id. at *20.
116. Id. at *20–21.
117. Id. at *22.
118. Id. at *24–25.
119. Id. at *26.
120. Id at *27.
121. Id. at *28.
122. Id.
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3. Failing to Adequately Allege Facts Showing Strong Inference of
Scienter
a. Iron Workers Benefit & Pension Fund—Iron Workers Dist.
Council Phila. & Vicinity v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.
In Iron Workers, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal
of the shareholder plaintiff’s complaint for failing to adequately allege
scienter.123 In a short opinion, the court found that the plaintiff’s allega-
tions that the defendant petroleum company “could not remotely moni-
tor or deactivate about 800 of its 6,800 wells” as stated on its website, or
that two company officers knew the company was not in compliance with
applicable Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission rules did not
meet the heightened requirements of the PSLRA’s pleading require-
ment.124 The allegations were “merely consistent with liability,” and
neither gave rise to a strong inference of an “intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud,” nor evidence an action done with “severe recklessness”
as required by the PSLRA.125
4. Failing to Plead Around PSLRA’s Safe Harbor—Naglich v.
Applied Optoelectronics
In Naglich, class action shareholder plaintiffs failed to avoid the
PSLRA’s safe-harbor for forward-looking statements by failing to plead
facts showing defendants had actual knowledge of the falsity of its state-
ments.126 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants concealed serious product
defects causing the defendant to suspend all shipping under lucrative sup-
ply contracts and thus rendering their “putatively ‘conservative’” earn-
ings guidance in a press release and earnings call materially misleading.127
The court found that the defendants’ statements about future earnings
trends were expressly qualified by statements such as, “the company cur-
rently expects” and “the views of management at the time such state-
ments are made,” which prevented any reasonable investor from viewing
the earnings guidance as a “guaranty” or “assurance.”128 Further, the
plaintiffs failed to adequately plead that the statements were not pro-
tected by the PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements.129
Though the plaintiffs alleged that the cautionary language included in the
earnings guidance was “boilerplate” and thus insufficient to be afforded
protection, the court concluded to the contrary; the cautionary language
addressed factors that could cause the projections to materially differ,
123. Iron Workers Benefit & Pension Fund—Iron Workers Dist. Council Phila. & Vi-
cinity v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 788 F. App’x 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
124. Id. at 269–70.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 371 (5th Cir.
2004).
127. Naglich v. Applied Optoelectronics, 436 F. Supp. 3d 954, 962 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 29,
2020).
128. Id. at 971.
129. Id. at 973.
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such as reliance on a small number of customers, changes in demand,
delays in shipments, and pricing pressure.130 Moreover, even if the de-
fendants did have a duty to update the earnings guidance as plaintiffs
claimed, defendants updated their guidance seven weeks later—a reason-
able time for investigation into the matter.131
D. CONSTRUING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND STATUTES OF
REPOSE
The TSA’s statute of limitations bars claims brought more than three
years “after the discovery of the untruth or omission” underlying the al-
leged securities violation.132 Additionally, the statute also bars claims
brought “more than five years after the date of the sale” occurs.133 Al-
though the five year period is “titled” a statute of limitations, most courts
characterize it as a statute of repose.134 A five-year time bar is also appli-
cable to criminal indictments for securities fraud.135
The time bars applicable to federal securities claims function similarly.
Federal statute provides a statute of limitations for claims brought more
than two years “after the discovery of the facts constituting the viola-
tion”136 and a statute of repose that serves as an absolute bar to claims
brought five years after the violation occurs, regardless of when the claim
is discovered or injury ultimately occurs.137 The limitations and repose
periods often generate substantial litigation issues, giving rise to creative
arguments about which actions (or series of actions) start the clock run-
ning on such periods, as exemplified in the cases below.
In Williams v. State, a Texas court considered whether the evidence was
legally sufficient to support a finding that theft and securities fraud oc-
curred “in aggregation, pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of
conduct,” under Texas Revised Civil Statute Annex art. 581-29-2.138 In
particular, the defendant argued that absent evidence of aggregation, he
was charged outside of the five year statute of limitations period.139 First,
the court considered whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sup-
port aggregation, and found that a reasonable jury could have concluded
130. Id.
131. Id. at 974.
132. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(H)(2)(a).
133. Id. art. 581-33(H)(2)(b).
134. Sistrunk v. Haddox, No. CV 18-516, 2020 WL 2549699, at *10 (W.D. La. May 19,
2020); Kubbernus v. ECAL Partners, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 444, 476 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).
135. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 581-29-1.
136. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1658(b)(1) (West).
137. See id. § 1658(b)(2); McCann v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 663 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“[A] period of repose bars a suit a fixed number of years after an action by the defendant
(such as manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the plaintiff suffers any
injury”); see also Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 650 (2010) (noting § 1658(b)(2) is
an “unqualified bar on actions instituted ‘5 years after such violation’”).
138. Williams v. State, No. 13-18-00454-CR, 2020 WL 1950864, at *8 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 23, 2020, pet. ref’d).
139. Id.
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a “scheme or course of conduct” existed.140 The court found that the de-
fendant’s method of defrauding investors was constant: he sold investor
contracts involving commercial real estate transactions he promised
would generate substantial returns, and then spent more than $100,000.00
of investor funds on personal expenses.141 Accordingly, the court held
that, since the limitations period ran from the time the last element of the
last offense occurred pursuant to that scheme, the defendant was not in-
dicted outside of the limitations period under the TSA, and his conviction
would stand.142
In Sistrunk, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court against their former
investment advisor, alleging that he churned their investment annuities
for generating excessive fees for himself and a financial advising firm.143
Plaintiffs brought various federal and state law claims, including a TSA
violation and violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.144 The court
was tasked with determining when the defendant’s alleged violations of
the Exchange Act occurred in order to analyze whether the plaintiff’s
claims were time-barred by the statute of repose.145 The court empha-
sized the difference between statutes of limitations, which begin to run
when the claim accrues, and statutes of repose, which place an outer limi-
tation on the right to bring an action measured from the date of the last
culpable act or omission of the defendant.146 The court found persuasive
prior case law interpreting the statute of repose as applied to churning
schemes.147 In a prior case, the court held that the five-year statute of
repose begins to run for churning scheme claims at the “moment the first
sale or violation occurs, regardless of the claimant’s discovery.”148 The
court thus rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the five-year statute of
repose should not begin to run until the churning scheme was discovered
or completed.149 Accordingly, the court dismissed with prejudice the
plaintiff’s federal securities claims as time-barred.150 With regard to plain-
tiff’s claims under the TSA, the court held that they were similarly time-
barred by Texas’s five-year statute of repose.151 The court also held that
the TSA’s definition of “securities” did not apply to annuities like the
140. Id. at *11.
141. Id. at *12.
142. Id.
143. Sistrunk v. Haddox, No. CV 18-516, 2020 WL 2549699, at *1 (W.D. La. May 19,
2020).
144. Id.
145. Id. at *7.
146. Id. at *6–7.
147. Id. at *8.
148. Id. (citing Escalon v. World Grp. Sec. Inc., No. 5:07-CV-214-C, 2008 WL 5572823,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2008)).
149. Id. at *8.
150. Id.
151. Id. at *10 (citing TEX. CIV. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(H)(2)(b)). The court also
noted that although the TSA titles the provision as a “limitations” period, the five-year
time bar is generally characterized as a statute of repose. Id. (citing Kubbernus v. ECAL
Partners, Ltd., 574 S.W.3d 444, 476 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied)).
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ones at issue in the case.152
E. RECEIVERSHIP ISSUES
In Zacharias v. Stanford International Bank, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s approval of a settlement in a Ponzi
scheme receivership and its entry of bar orders.153 The SEC sued an in-
vestment company and its related entities for allegedly perpetrating a
“massive, ongoing fraud” in the form of a Ponzi scheme.154 The court
appointed a receiver to marshal the assets of the investment company’s
entities, and it retrieved investment losses through various settlement
agreements.155 The plaintiff-objectors challenged the entry of the bar or-
ders, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter them.156
The Fifth Circuit remarked that equity receiverships are “older than
this country,” and that federal district courts are empowered by their se-
curities law jurisdiction to utilize receiverships when the troubled com-
pany will likely be unable to satisfy its liabilities to its investors.157 The
court also noted that a receiver has broad power, but the receivership
court “cannot reach claims that are independent and non-derivative” or
that “do not involve assets claimed by the receivership.”158 Plaintiffs al-
leged that their claims were independent of the receivership, with some
arguing that their claims sounded in tort or contract, or that the bar or-
ders could not apply to their misrepresentation claims because the set-
tling defendants had “direct contact” with them by “misrepresenting
Stanford’s financial soundness.”159 The court rejected the arguments by
which plaintiffs attempted to distinguish themselves with different theo-
ries of liability.160 According to the court, the objecting investors “rode
the Receiver train until the end and then decided to hold up a settlement
with a deep pocket.”161 Ultimately, the plaintiffs’ claims were derivative
of and dependent upon the receiver’s, and the court refused to allow
them to “jump the queue” and “escape pro rata distribution.”162 Thus,
the court upheld the district court’s bar orders and jurisdiction to enter
them.163
IV. SUPREME COURT UPDATES AND OPEN QUESTIONS
The United States Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated decision
in Liu v. SEC, a case addressing in what circumstances the SEC has au-
152. Id. (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 581-4(A)).
153. Zacarias v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 945 F.3d 883, 904 (5th Cir. 2019).
154. Id. at 889.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 895–96.
158. Id. at 897.
159. Id. at 899.
160. Id. at 900.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 902.
163. Id. at 902, 905.
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thority to seek and obtain disgorgement as equitable relief. Additionally,
three years after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Lucia v. SEC,
questions regarding litigating securities law claims before administrative
law judges continue to percolate throughout the lower courts.
A. LIU DECISION
In Liu v. SEC, the Supreme Court considered the SEC’s ability to ob-
tain disgorgement as equitable relief in civil enforcement proceedings
under Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act.164 The Court ultimately held
that disgorgement is permissible as “equitable relief” if it does not exceed
the wrongdoer’s illicit net profits and is returned to the wrongdoer’s
victims.165
Liu involved an investment scheme to defraud foreign investors that
was operated by petitioners, Charles Liu and Xin Wang, who raised
nearly $27 million from foreign investors seeking to qualify for United
States visas by investing in United States businesses.166 The trial court
ordered Liu and Wang to disgorge the full amount of money they had
raised from investors.167
Shortly after the trial court’s decision in Liu, the Supreme Court de-
cided in Kokesh that disgorgement was a “penalty” for statute of limita-
tions purposes.168 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and
to the Supreme Court, petitioners relied heavily on Kokesh; arguing that
because disgorgement was a “penalty” for purposes of the statute of limi-
tations, it could not be “equitable relief” by definition.169 However, the
Supreme Court noted that its decision in Kokesh expressly leaves open
the question of whether disgorgement is available as equitable relief.170
Petitioners further argued that even if disgorgement was an available
remedy, it was limited to net profits and not gross receipts, the lower
court’s rulings failed to account for their legitimate business expenses,
and the decision failed to return the award to the investors.171 For its
part, the SEC contended that the main principle of equitable relief was to
deprive the wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains, rather than return the profits to
investors as a form of restitution.172
The Court held that disgorgement is permissible “equitable relief” that
can be ordered in an SEC enforcement action in federal court if (1) the
amount of the award does not exceed the wrongdoer’s net profits, and (2)
the money is awarded to the victims (not retained by the SEC).173
164. Liu v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1941
167. Id. at 1937.
168. Id. at 1940 (citing Kokesh v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1637 (2017)).
169. Id. at 1946.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1947.
172. Id. at 1948.
173. Id. at 1949–50; Supreme Court Permits SEC Disgorgement of Net Profits in Liu v.
SEC, HOLLAND & KNIGHT, LLP (June 22, 2020), https://media.hklaw.com/wp-content/
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The Court’s holding attempts to balance the countervailing considera-
tions of equity: that wrongdoers should not be allowed to profit from
their wrongdoing, nor should they be punished by paying more than fair
compensation to the harmed person.174 However, as explained in the Sec-
tion below, questions regarding the court’s restrictions on disgorgement
awards remain—particularly in light of the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act (NDAA).175
B. NDAA EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZES DISGORGEMENT ACTIONS,
EXPANDS STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, AND RAISES MORE
QUESTIONS POST-LIU
Although the Liu decision upheld a federal court’s authority to order
disgorgement as equitable relief, until recently, there was no statutory
authority to that effect. Congress attempted to pass legislation addressing
the SEC’s authority to pursue disgorgement in the federal court context.
For example, House of Representatives Bill 4344, the Investor Protection
and Capital Markets Fairness Act, passed the House in November 2019
by a vote of 314–95.176 The bill sought to amend 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d) to
authorize the SEC to seek disgorgement as a remedy for unjust enrich-
ment and included a fourteen-year statute of limitations.177 The Senate
passed a similar bill except in that it contained a ten-year statute of limi-
tations.178 Ultimately, the NDAA, introduced on March 6, 2020, and
signed into law over presidential veto on January 1, 2021, effectively
mooted the prior House and Senate Bills.179 Section 6501 of the NDAA
expressly authorizes the SEC to seek “disgorgement . . . of any unjust
enrichment by the person who received such unjust enrichment” because
of securities law violations.180 Notably absent from the NDAA is the Ex-
change Act’s language that the Court analyzed in Liu—that equitable re-
lief be “for the benefit of the investors.”181 Accordingly, this calls into
question whether the SEC will be permitted to keep the disgorgement
award rather than returning it to the investors.
Additionally, the NDAA extended the statute of limitations periods for
seeking disgorgement awards. Specifically, for any violations that require
uploads/2020/06/22160436/Client-Alert-Supreme-Court-Rules-in-Liu-v-SEC.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NK46-BQFL].
174. Supreme Court Permits SEC Disgorgement of Net Profits in Liu v. SEC, supra note
173.
175. Daniel Walfish & Rachel Penski Fissell, Exchange Act Amendments Would Bolster
SEC Enforcement, LAW360 (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1339563/ex-
change-act-amendments-would-bolster-sec-enforcement [https://perma.cc/Q646-CHN7].
176. The Investor Protection and Capital Markets Fairness Act, H.R. 4344, 116th Cong.
(2019–2020).
177. Id.
178. S. 799, 116th Cong. (2019).
179. H.R. 6395, 116th Cong. (2019).
180. National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong. § 6501(a)(1)(B),
(a)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d)(3)(A)(ii), (d)(7)).
181. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d)(5), with National Defense Authorization Act, H.R.
6395, 116th Cong. § 6501(a)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d)(7)).
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the SEC to prove the defendant’s “scienter,” (such as Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act,182 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,183 and Sec-
tion 206(1) of the Investment Advisor’s Act of 1940184) the limitations
period for seeking disgorgement is expanded to ten years from the last
date of misconduct.185
C. AN OPEN QUESTION: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LITIGATING CLAIMS
BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
In 2018, the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, where Raymond
Lucia appealed an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) ruling that he vio-
lated securities laws.186 Lucia argued that the ALJ who decided his case
was an officer of the United States, but was not appointed by the Presi-
dent, courts of law, or the heads of departments, as required by the Ap-
pointments Clause.187 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the
proper remedy for the SEC’s constitutional violation was to grant Lucia a
new hearing before the SEC itself or before a new, constitutionally ap-
pointed ALJ.188
In the wake of Lucia, the SEC remanded “all proceedings currently
pending before the Commission to the Office of Administrative Law
Judges” to hold new hearings consistent with the Appointments
Clause.189 The defendant in one remanded case is Michelle Cochran, who
the SEC alleges violated the Exchange Act.190 Per Lucia, a new ALJ took
Cochran’s case. Cochran then filed suit in district court alleging in part a
novel constitutional issue: that the restrictions on removing SEC ALJs
violate separation of powers requirements under Free Enterprise Fund v.
PCAOB.191
In Free Enterprise Fund, the SEC appointed all five members of the
PCAOB (a governmental entity for constitutional purposes), and all five
members were officers of the United States.192 The statute mandated that
the members could only be removed by the SEC “for good cause shown,”
and the SEC Commissioners could not be removed by the President ex-
cept for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”193 The
Supreme Court found that such a double-protection against removal vio-
182. 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b).
183. Id. § 77(q)(a)(1).
184. Id. § 80(b)-6(1).
185. National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 6395 116th Cong. § 6501(a)(8)(A).
186. Lucia v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2047 (2018).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2048 (citing Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 188 (1995)).
189. In re Pending Administrative Proceedings, Exchange Act Release No. 83907, 2018
WL 4003609 (Aug. 22, 2018) https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2018/33-10536.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WP6N-6LJE].
190. Cochran v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 969 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir.), as revised (Aug. 12,
2020), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 978 F.3d 975 (5th Cir. 2020).
191. Id. (citing Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484
(2010)).
192. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 477.
193. Id. (citing Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)).
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lates separation of powers because the President “is no longer the judge
of the Board’s conduct. He can neither ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed, nor be held responsible for a Board member’s breach of
faith.”194
Similarly, Cochran alleged that SEC ALJs enjoy unconstitutional
double-protection against removal.195 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
heard oral argument on January 20, 2021 to determine whether a federal
court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear Cochran’s case before the
conclusion of SEC administrative proceedings. Depending on how the
Fifth Circuit rules, Cochran could again upend SEC adjudication and may
spark congressional action.
V. LOOKING AHEAD: RULEMAKINGS, PREDICTIONS, AND
CASES TO WATCH
A. RECENTLY ADOPTED RULEMAKINGS AND PROPOSED RULES
ATTEMPT TO EXPAND ACCESS TO PRIVATE MARKETS
1. Expanded Definition of “Accredited Investor” and Implications for
Investors and Issuers
Under federal securities laws, offers and sales of securities must be reg-
istered with the SEC, unless an applicable exemption applies.196 In Octo-
ber 2020, the SEC promulgated a final rule that revised and broadened
the definition of an “accredited investor” under the Securities Act of
1933.197 An accredited investor is a person or entity permitted to invest in
securities without registration from the SEC if that person or entity meets
certain income or net worth guidelines.198 Essentially, these persons are
deemed to have the knowledge and expertise to participate in private
markets.199 The final rule, effective as of December 8, 2020, expanded the
definition to include new categories of “natural persons” and entities who
qualify as accredited investors.200
As to natural persons, the definition of “accredited investor” now in-
cludes persons holding certain professional licenses;201 a person consid-
ered a “knowledgeable employee”202 of the issuer of the securities being
offered or sold, as that term is defined in Rule 3c–5(a)(4) of the Invest-
194. Id.
195. Cochran, 969 F.3d at 510.
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(e).
197. 85 Fed. Reg. 64234 (Oct. 9, 2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240).
198. See Amendments to Accredited Investor Definition, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://
www.sec.gov/corpfin/amendments-accredited-investor-definition-secg (last modified Dec.
8, 2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 64234, 64235 (Oct. 9, 2020) (“Qualifying as an accredited investor, as
an individual or an institution, is significant because accredited investors may, under Com-
mission rules, participate in investment opportunities that are generally not available to
nonaccredited investors, including certain investments in private companies and offerings
by certain hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds.”).
199. Amendments to Accredited Investor Definition, supra note 198.
200. Id.
201. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(10).
202. Id. § 230.501(a)(11).
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ment Company Act of 1940; or a “family client” of a “family office” pur-
suant to the definitions in the Investor Adviser’s Act.203 With regard to
new categories of qualifying entities, the new rule expanded the defini-
tion to include “SEC-and state-registered investment advisers, rural busi-
ness investment companies, limited liability companies, family offices,
family clients,” and a catch-all category, to include entities owning invest-
ments exceeding $5 million.204
The new categories signal a shift from using accumulated wealth as a
“proxy of financial sophistication” to considering experience and overall
ability to assess investment opportunities.205 For issuers of securities, this
new definition could potentially expand the number of persons and enti-
ties to whom they can offer or sell securities to without the additional
expense of registration. The SEC anticipates that the rule amendments
will reduce search costs of finding investors due to a potentially lower
cost of determining and verifying accredited investor status.206 On the
investor side, individuals and entities swept into the definition under the
new rules will be able to access investment opportunities previously un-
available to them, including private equity, venture capital, and hedge
fund offerings.207 Such opportunities are significant—in 2019, an esti-
mated more than $1.5 trillion in capital was raised through unregistered
offerings as compared to $1.2 trillion raised through registered
offerings.208
In November 2020, the TSSB also proposed an amendment to its rules
to bring its definition of “accredited investor” into alignment with the
SEC’s definition.209 The new rule exempts persons who offer or sell se-
curities to accredited investors or render investment advice to accredited
investors from the registration requirements of the TSA.210 The TSA
adopted these rules in March 2021.211
2. Proposed Rule Creating “Finder” Exception to Requirement to
Register as a Broker and Implications for Enforcement
Additionally, in October 2020, the SEC proposed (but as of this writ-
ing, has not adopted) a new rule that would allow natural persons to en-
gage in limited capital raising activities (finders), and receive transaction-
based compensation, without having to register with the SEC as a
203. Id. § 230.501(a)(13).
204. 85 Fed. Reg. 64234, 64245–51 (Oct. 9, 2020) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1),
(a)(12)).
205. See id. at 64234, 64235.
206. See id. at 64234, 64260.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 64234, 64259.
209. 45 TEX. REG. 7822, 7823 (2020) (to be codified at 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 107.2)
(proposed Nov. 6, 2020) (Tex. State Sec. Bd., Terminology).
210. Id.
211. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 107.2, 109.4, 109.5, 109.6 (2021) (Tex. State Sec. Bd.,
Terminology).
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broker.212
Due to their roles as intermediaries between customers and securities
markets, brokers are required to register with the SEC unless an excep-
tion or exemption applies.213 The Exchange Act currently broadly defines
“brokers” to mean “any person [or entity] engaged in the business of
effecting transactions in securities for the account of others . . . .”214 The
Exchange Act does not define what it means to be “engaged in the busi-
ness of effective transactions in securities.”215 In examining broker status,
courts and the SEC itself have found determining “broker” status is a
fact-intensive inquiry, with a key consideration being the individual’s
“regular participation” in securities transactions “at key points in the
distribution.”216
Many individuals alleged to have violated the registration rules applica-
ble to brokers argue that they were not “brokers,” but rather “mere find-
ers”—essentially “matchmakers” for investors and issuers who facilitated
introductions.217 However, the SEC currently does not recognize this
“mere finder” type of exemption, and courts have reached uneven results
on the issue.218 Some have found solicitation of investors does subject the
soliciting individual to the broker requirements,219 while others have
found that “merely bringing together” individuals as part of a securities
transaction is “not enough” to incur liability.220
The proposed rule would clarify the confusion surrounding the broker
definition by creating exemptions for two tiers of natural persons consid-
ered “finders.”221 For both tiers, the exemption would only be applicable
if:
• The issuer is not required to file reports under Section 13 or Section
15(d) of the Exchange Act;
• The issuer is seeking to conduct the securities offering in reliance on
an applicable exemption from registration under the Securities Act
of 1933;
• The Finder does not engage in general solicitation;
212. See 85 Fed. Reg. 64542 (Oct. 13, 2020).
213. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(a).
214. See id. § 78(c)(a)(4)(A).
215. See id. § 78(c)(a).
216. See, e.g., U.S. S.E.C. v. Bravata, No. 09-12950, 2009 WL 2245649 (E.D. Mich. July
27, 2009) (internal citations omitted).
217. See 85 Fed. Reg. 64545 n. 45.
218. See 85 Fed. Reg. 64542, 64545 (Oct. 13, 2020).
219. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Helms, No. A-13-CV-01036, 2015 WL 5010298, at *17 (W.D.
Tex. Aug. 21, 2015) (“In determining whether a person ‘effected transactions [for purposes
of the Exchange Act registration requirements],’ courts consider several factors, such as
whether the person: (1) [s]olicited investors to purchase securities[;] (2) was involved in
negotiations between the issuer and the investor[;] and (3) received transaction-related
compensation.”).
220. Apex Glob. Partners, Inc. v. Kaye/Bassman Intern. Corp., No. 3:09-CV-637-M,
2009 WL 2777869, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2009) (“Merely bringing together the parties to
transactions, even those involving the purchase and sale of securities, is not enough” to
warrant broker registration under Section 15(a)).
221. See 85 Fed. Reg. 64542, 64546 (Oct. 13, 2020).
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• The potential investor is an “accredited investor” as defined in Rule
501 of Regulation D or the finder has a reasonable belief that the
potential investor is an “accredited investor”;
• The finder provides services pursuant to a written agreement with
the issuer that includes a description of the services provided and
associated compensation;
• The finder is not an associated person of a broker-dealer; and
• The finder is not subject to statutory disqualification, as that term is
defined in Section 3(a)(39) of the Exchange Act, at the time of his
or her participation.222
Importantly, the proposed rule narrowly construes these exemptions to
apply only to “finders” soliciting investments for companies who are not
required to register their securities with the SEC, and they can only en-
gage with potential investors who the finder knows or reasonably believes
to be an “accredited investor.”223 This evidences the balance between ex-
panding access to investment opportunities in private markets while limit-
ing those opportunities to sophisticated investors who can assess and bear
the associated risk.
The proposed rule also delineates permissible activities for each tier of
“finder.” For example, Tier I finders would be limited to providing the
issuer with potential investor’s contact information—and for that, only
“in connection with one capital-raising transaction for a single issuer in a
twelve-month period.”224 Tier II finders are entitled to engage in broader
activities, but are subject to heightened requirements. Tier II finders are
limited to “(i) [i]dentifying, screening, and contacting potential investors;
(ii) distributing issuer offering materials to investors; (iii) discussing is-
suer information included in any offering materials,” as long as they do
not provide advice regarding the valuation or advisability of the invest-
ment; and (iv) arranging meetings between the issuer and investor.225 A
Tier II finder would also be required to disclose information about their
role and compensation in the transaction, as well as to obtain the poten-
tial investor’s written acknowledgment of receipt of such disclosures.226
The SEC proposed the proposed rule in recognition of the declining num-
ber of registered broker-dealers, particularly those willing to find inves-
tors to help businesses raise capital when the amount of investment
sought by the business falls below $5 million.227 The proposed rule is an
attempt to bridge the gap for businesses seeking less capital than required
to attract large broker-dealers, but more than the amount that could be
provided through personal network and fundraising efforts.228
222. Id. at 64546–47.
223. Id. at 64547.
224. Id. at 64548.
225. Id. at 64548–49.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 64543.
228. See id.
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If the rule is adopted, it stands to reason that enforcement activities for
violators of the registration requirements will decrease as more persons
qualifying as “finders” can be exempt from the registration requirements.
However, it should be noted that exemption from registration does not
exempt “finders” from the anti-fraud provisions of the Act.229
B. CASES TO WATCH
The TSA’s mandate that registered firms report suspected exploitation
of elderly and vulnerable victims230 lead to a report against Metals.com, a
precious metals dealer who defrauded elderly investors into purchasing
overpriced gold and silver. TSSB settled the matter with Metals.com, who
agreed to refund eighty-four Texas investors in July 2019.231 Later, how-
ever, the CFTC, the State of Texas, and twenty-nine other states and state
regulators filed suit in the Northern District of Texas, alleging Metals.com
fraudulently solicited and received more than $185 million in customer
funds, most of which were retirement savings.232 Plaintiffs secured a tem-
porary restraining order against Metals.com on September 22, 2020,
which froze Metal.com’s assets and appointed a temporary receiver.233
This case may be one to watch as it makes its way through the litigation
process in 2021.
C. SEC’S FOCUS FOR UPCOMING YEAR
1. SEC Reviews Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosures in
Effort to Update Guidance
In early 2021, the Acting Chair of the SEC, Allison Herren Lee, issued
a directive to the Division of Corporate Finance to “enhance its focus on
climate-related disclosures” in company public filings.234 In particular,
she directed the staff to review public companies’ compliance and ad-
dressing of topics identified in the SEC’s 2010 guidance.235 Through in-
sights garnered during this process, the Division will begin to update the
229. Andrew May, New Proposed SEC Rule Would Allow Finders to Receive Commis-




230. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-45(B).
231. Metals.com to Offer Full Refunds to Texas Investors in Deal Likely to Exceed $10
Million, TEX. STATE SEC. BD. (July 1, 2019), https://www.ssb.texas.gov/news-publications/
metalscom-offer-full-refunds-texas-investors-deal-likely-exceed-10-million [https://
perma.cc/3YX7-3EDM].
232. Plaintiff’s Petition, Comm. Futures Trading Comm’n v. TMTE, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-
02910-L (Sept. 22, 2020).
233. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Statutory Restraining
Order, Appointment of Receiver, and Equitable Relief, Comm. Futures Trading Comm’n
v. TMTE, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-02910-L (Sept. 22, 2020).
234. Allison Herren Lee, Statement on the Review of Climate-Related Disclosure,
SEC.GOV (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-re-
view-climate-related-disclosure [https://perma.cc/E892-2TAD].
235. Id.
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2010 guidance and account for developments over the past decade, with
an ultimate goal of creating a framework for consistent climate-related
disclosures.236
In the enforcement arena, this could mean an uptick in enforcement
actions related to failure to disclose to investors information that impli-
cates climate risk. Additionally, companies are likely waiting for detailed
guidance related to the scope and form of the disclosures required. The
SEC’s new disclosure requirements are likely to be required on quarterly
and annual reports—but the SEC could also go as far as to require these
disclosures in proxy statements to shareholders.237 Companies should be
ready to assess the Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)-re-
lated impacts of their businesses including operations, greenhouse gas
emissions, and even expenditures to combat climate change.238
D. SEC POLICY CHANGES IN LIGHT OF NEW PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION
1. Delegated Authority and Re-empowerment of Staff
In addition, Acting Chair Allison Lee issued a statement authorizing
the re-empowerment of senior officers at the Commission.239 The acting
chair authorized senior officers to approve the issuance of a formal order
of investigation, thereby allowing them to invoke the delegated authority
of the Commission in permitting staff to “subpoena documents and take
sworn testimony.”240 According to Lee, this will help the Commission
more swiftly and efficiently investigate ongoing frauds during a time
where the pace of such frauds is increasing rapidly.241
Lee’s action demonstrates a return to the pre-Trump era authority of
the Commission, signaling a turn to a potentially more assertive SEC
under the Biden administration.242 Under former President Trump, the
SEC’s number of new investigations fell every year.243 With this re-em-
powerment of staff, we could see an uptick in enforcement and poten-
tially a return to pre-Trump-era numbers in the years ahead.
236. Id.
237. Louis Rambo & Frank Zarb, Expect New SEC Leadership to Require More ESG
Reporting, JD SUPRA (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/expect-new-sec-
leadership-to-require-6303414/ [https://perma.cc/PBG6-F5QP].
238. See id.
239. Allison Herren Lee, Statement of Acting Chair Allison Herren Lee on Empowering
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2. Separation of Waiver and Settlement Recommendation Process
In another return to prior SEC practices, Acting Chair Lee also rein-
forced the separation between the SEC’s enforcement process and con-
sideration of requests for waivers from disqualifications.244 Certain
securities law violations trigger automatic disqualifications from privi-
leges, such as being considered a “Well-Seasoned Known Issuer” (WSKI)
or participating in private offerings under Rule 501 Regulation D.245 The
SEC has the discretion to grant waivers of such disqualifications.246 Many
WKSIs are large banks or corporations who rely on these waivers to be
able to continue to participate in private offerings—and they often seek
waivers in conjunction with their settlement offers. The Acting Chair ex-
plained that best practices are to separate the consideration of waivers
applications from the considerations related to settlement of enforcement
cases.247 Accordingly, the enforcement division “will no longer recom-
mend to the Commission a settlement offer that is conditioned on grant-
ing a waiver,” and the Corporate Finance and Investment Division will
instead review such waivers under “separate and distinct” standards.248
However, not everyone at the Commission is on board with the change
to the settlement and waiver process. Two commissioners voiced their dis-
sent with Acting Chair Lee’s statement, indicating their support for the
Commission’s policy of considering and accepting contingent settlement
offers.249 While Acting Chair Lee expressed that the process should not
be used as a negotiation tool,250 Commissioners Peirce and Roisman
countered that accepting contingent settlement offers “acknowledges the
reality that an entity’s willingness to reach a prompt settlement on just
and fair terms often is influenced by its concerns regarding the potential
collateral consequences of entering into the settlement.”251 They sug-
gested that entities would likely be less willing to settle if “left in the
dark” about their waiver application status.252 Furthermore, they empha-
sized that the policy has worked out well, increased efficiency, and has
not introduced any “structural conflicts or pressures” between the Divi-
sion of Investment Management and the Division of Corporation Fi-
nance, and that returning to the prior process will “result in a longer
period between the initiation and resolution of enforcement matters.”253
244. Allison Herren Lee, Statement of Acting Chair Allison Herren Lee on Contingent
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Whether the concerns raised by the dissenting commissioners will re-
sult from the separation of the waiver and settlement process remains to
be seen. However, now that companies cannot ask for a waiver when it
offers to settle and subsequently revoke its settlement offer if the Com-
mission declines to grant a waiver—more companies will have to consider
whether to invest in long-haul litigation. Furthermore, this policy signals
that the SEC intends to be more aggressive from an enforcement stand-
point and possibly more reluctant to grant waivers in the future.254
3. Division of Examinations Priorities
Each year for the past eight years, the SEC’s Division of Examinations
(EXAMS, formerly, the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examina-
tions (OCIE)255), announces its examination priorities for the upcoming
fiscal year to identify key risks, trends, and priorities it will assess as part
of its overall mission to protect investors and monitor compliance.256 For
Fiscal Year 2021, EXAMS identified several key areas that provide valua-
ble insights about what the future holds regarding enforcement trends
and possible sweep initiatives.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering the market volatility experienced
over the past year and related pressures, EXAMS indicated a focus area
of fraud and sales practices, particularly with an eye to broker-dealers,
investment companies, and registered investment advisors’ standards of
conduct.257 Additionally, in light of the new rule revising the definition of
“accredited investor,” EXAMS will also examine compliance related to
those changes when selling private offerings.258 As part of its retail-
targeted investments priority, EXAMS announced its commitment to
“deterring microcap fraud, or fraud in connection with securities of com-
panies with a market capitalization under $250 million.”259 Because the
prior year saw various issuers of such securities make dubious claims re-
lated to COVID-19 testing, treatments, and vaccines, EXAMS stated it
would continue to monitor these circumstances.260
EXAMS will continue to review the compliance programs of both reg-
istered investment advisors and investment companies.261 Of particular
note is the continued priority of ESG-factors.262 EXAMS indicated that
registered investment advisors are “increasingly offering” strategies with
254. SEC Reverses Position on Accepting Settlement Offers Contingent on Waivers, Cre-
ating Once Again Risk That Defendants Will Be Forced to Make Settlement Decision with
Significant Uncertainty, SHEARMAN & STERLING (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.lit-
wc.shearman.com/sec-reverses-position-on-accepting-settlement-offers-contingent [https://
perma.cc/JT9D-5C2Y].
255. DIV. EXAMS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2021 EXAMINATION PRIORITIES 1
(2021), https://www.sec.gov/files/2021-exam-priorities.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K42-FMVE].
256. Id.
257. Id. at 21.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 23.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 28.
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reference to terms like “sustainable, socially responsible, impact, and
ESG conscious.”263 Accordingly, EXAMS intends to prioritize review of
these strategies and adequacy of disclosures to ensure alignment between
them.264
In response to the work-from-home environment occasioned by the
pandemic, EXAMS will also address information security because of the
critical role it plays in the financial market’s operation.265 EXAMS will
monitor whether firms have taken adequate precautions to safeguard cus-
tomer data, respond to data breaches, and manage operational risk as
their employees work remotely.266 Relatedly, EXAMS will examine
firms’ “business continuity and disaster recovery plans,” particularly in
light of large-scale climate events.267
E. PREDICTIONS
As the pandemic-related economic fallout continues, we are likely to
see an increase in COVID-19 related lawsuits, including securities class
actions. This is especially likely given the SEC’s guidance from April en-
couraging public companies to disclose as much information as practica-
ble concerning their financial and operations status.268 The SEC has
already shown its willingness to bring enforcement actions based on fail-
ures to disclose—and class-action litigation based on the same may not be
far behind. We are still at the beginning stages of watching the unwinding
of COVID-19-related fraud make its way through the court system, the
aftermath of which is likely to play out over the next several years.
VI. CONCLUSION
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 launched a flurry of en-
forcement actions related to securities fraud—both directly related to
fraudulent healthcare technology schemes and for public companies’ fail-
ures to disclose the economic effects of the pandemic on their businesses
to investors. In Texas, state securities enforcement was likewise active,
with the TSSB expectedly continuing its focus on cryptocurrency, binary
and foreign exchange options, and oil and gas, this year with the added
overlay of COVID-19-related frauds. Although a relatively slow year in
terms of private litigation and class action lawsuits, the cases that did
make their way through the courts this year still provided valuable insight
into pleading deficiencies common in bringing securities class action suits.
In TSA cases, we saw a judicial reluctance to create a common law cause
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 24.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 25.
268. See Jay Clayton & William Hinman, Chair Corp. Fin., The Importance of Disclo-
sure—For Investors, Markets and Our Fight Against COVID-19, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-hin-
man [https://perma.cc/982U-8FDY]; see also supra Section II.B.
2021] Securities Regulation 299
of action for aiding and abetting fraud, but the continued limitation of the
Texas Anti-SLAPP statute. The United States Supreme Court also ren-
dered its highly anticipated Liu decision, which outlines guidelines for
seeking disgorgement. The subsequent passage of the NDAA statutorily
enshrined the SEC’s ability to seek disgorgement and bolstered the
SEC’s authority—but raises the question of whether, under Liu, the prof-
its must be returned to the investors, because the statute is silent to that
effect.
Additionally, the political impacts of the 2020 election of President
Biden and his new administration suggest a return to a more aggressive
SEC. Re-empowerment of staff and directives by the Acting Chair to fo-
cus on ESG disclosures likely foreshadow the number and types of en-
forcement actions that may unfold in the coming months and years.
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